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Abstract
Social preferences like interpersonal altruism, fairness, reciprocity and inequity aversion are inherently linked to departures
from pure self-interest. During economic interactions, for example, defectors may be punished even if this implies a cost for
the punishers. This violation of canonical assumptions in economics indicates that socially oriented decisions may
predominate over self-centred stances. Here we explore whether the personal experience of pain changes the balance
between self-gain and socially based choices. We used laser stimulation to induce pain or a warm sensation in subjects
playing a modified version of the Ultimatum Game (UG) both in the role of responder and proposer. After each shot,
responders evaluated the fairness of the offer. Moreover, responders and proposers rated the intensity and unpleasantness
of the sensation evoked by the laser stimulation. Results show that suffering proposers decrease fair offers and suffering
responders increase their acceptance rate irrespective of economic offer. Crucially, the intensity of painful stimulation has a
predictive role on Moderately Unfair offers’ acceptance rates. Thus the personal experience of pain may favour the
emergence of a self-centered perspective aimed at maximizing self-gain. The results suggest that bodily states play a
fundamental role in higher-order interpersonal negotiations and interactions.
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Introduction
Canonical models of economics posit that material self-interest
is the sole motivational force guiding human behavior. This
picture is challenged by the observation that under various
circumstances people take into account also the welfare of others
[1]. Modern economics and psychological theories [2,3,4] support
the notion that altruistic, fair and trusting behaviors represent
essential ingredients of strategic interactions. The view of human
nature as not purely self-regarding but also including social
preferences (e.g. interpersonal altruism, fairness, reciprocity and
inequity aversion) inspired combined neuroimaging techniques
and game theory studies, aimed at exploring the brain processes
underlying the implementation of specific social behaviors like
fairness [5]. A routinely employed task is the Ultimatum Game
(UG) [1], where one player (proposer) plays as the first mover and
decides how to divide a given amount of money (e.g. J 10) in an
anonymous one-shot interaction. In this condition, negotiation
effects are ruled out by the absence of repeated plays. The
proposer decides how to split the stake with the only constraint
that the responder cannot get 0 (e.g. J 8 for him/her, J 2 for the
other player). If the responder accepts, each player keeps the
allocated amount of money; if he/she rejects the offer, both players
receive nothing. According to standard economic models, in order
to maximize his/her own payoff the responder should accept any
offer. Indeed, although inequitable, any offer is better than
nothing. However, in accordance with theories of reciprocity [6]
and inequity aversion [2], participants systematically reject unfair
offers below the 20–30% of the total pot [7,4], preferring to gain
nothing rather than accept unequal distribution of resources [5].
The human tendency to punish defectors has a vital role in
maintaining cooperation and converting individual loss into a gain
for the group, even though it yields no direct benefits or is even
costly to the punisher [8,9]. Experimental economic games
provide a unique opportunity to elicit social preferences and
measure how much players are willing to sacrifice their own
economic payoff if this allows them to punish defectors [4,10].
Indeed in the course of the last decade, researchers attempted to
understand the brain processes that govern social preferences like
fairness, using modern neuroimaging techniques. Pioneer fMRI
[11,12] and TMS studies [13,14] using the ultimatum game (UG),
for example, hint at the existence of a neuronal circuitry
comprising the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex, the bilateral anterior
insula and the anterior cingulate cortex specifically involved in the
perceived fairness of others [11].
Studies on the objective and contextual aspects of fairness
highlight the different neural underpinnings of objective social
inequality with respect to contextual aspect of fairness [15].
Moreover, behavioral studies show that incidental negative
emotion influences behavioral responses [16,17,18] and fairness
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shown, for example that emotion of disgust elicits higher rejection
rate of unfair offers, with respect to sadness and neutral states [16].
Thus, emotions may shape social preferences, and in some
circumstances exacerbate the tendency to punish free-riders.
Little is known about whether the personal experience of pain
modulates the rejection of unfair offers or the decision to
reciprocate altruistically. Although pain has been considered as
an inherently private experience, recent neuroscientific evidence
indicates that the first-hand experience of pain makes individuals
more prone to react to the pain of others according to egocentric
rather than to other-oriented stances, adopting a less empathic
attitude. [19].
Here, we expand current knowledge by attempting to determine
whether acute pain reduces social preferences as indexed by an
iterated version of the one-shot UG. We employed a bilateral
version of the ultimatum game where participants alternatively
acted as proposer or responder while receiving on the dorsum of
the left hand, laser stimuli that could induce acute pain (Pain
condition) or a warm sensation (Heat condition). The procedure
allowed us to explore whether being in pain specifically affects the
decision of a given individual to accept a given amount of money
when playing in the role of responder and the way in which he/she
divides a sum of money when playing in the role of proposer.
Finding higher acceptance rates of unfair offers and lower offers in
the pain with respect to heat condition would support the notion
that pain perception may induce a self-centered bias that
ultimately inhibit the tendency to implement socially oriented
behaviors like altruistic punishment.
Materials and Methods
Participants
Thirty healthy right-handed subjects (14 female; age range: 18
to 36 years (M=23.93, SD=4.56) recruited via an opportunity
sample, participated in the study. Subjects were paid a fixed
amount of 15 Euros. In addition, they were informed they would
effectively receive the money earned during the economic game.
Participants gave their written consent and were naı ¨ve as to the
purposes of the study. The experimental protocol was approved by
the local Ethics Committee at the Fondazione Santa Lucia and the
study was conducted in accordance with the ethical standards of
the 1964 Declaration of Helsinki.
The Ultimatum game
Subjects were told they were going to play an economic game
against other participants located at other two remote Italian
Universities, using an-internet based platform. They were also told
that depending on the platform’s requirement they were to play in
different blocks the role of proposer or of responder. The
proposer’s role was to decide how to split 1 J while the
responder’s role was to decide whether to accept or reject the
offer. If the responder accepted, each player would keep the
allocated amount. If he/she rejected the offer, both players would
receive nothing.
To rule out the possibility of any negotiation between
participants, subjects were ensured that for each match they
would be randomly paired with an anonymous partner. Unknown
to the participants, the game took place against a PC device, which
was programmed using E-Prime software 1.2.
Laser stimulation
Laser stimulation was delivered with an infrared neodymium
yttrium aluminium perovskite laser (EL.EN. Group) to the dorsum
of the left hand. The laser stimulation allowed us to induce acute
painful and warm sensation on the body part selectively stimulated
by the laser beam without the concurrent experience of touch. We
determined the individual heat and pain threshold according to
the method of limits [20]. The threshold values corresponded to
the lowest painful or warm sensation that can be reliably detected
in 5 out of 10 trials and were determined before each experimental
condition. Moreover, pain and heat thresholds were determined at
the beginning of each block. The fluency of the stimuli used in the
Pain and Heat Condition was 30% over the painful and warm
threshold values; both in the responder (Pain=14.8 J/cm
2, 64.0;
Heat=8.7 cm
262.9), and in the proposer (Pain=15.1 cm
2, 63.6;
Heat=9.2 cm
262.1) role.
Laser pulses were delivered in blocks of 10 trials. To avoid
nociceptors fatigue or sensitization, the location of the laser on the
skin was slightly shifted after each stimulus. An area of about
8c m
2 on the radial side of the hand dorsum was stimulated.
Moreover, a 5–7 seconds interstimulus interval (ISI) allowed us to
minimize central habituation effects. The distance between the
laser stimulator and the hand was kept constant (and was about
2 cm).
Experimental Procedure
Subjects were seated in a comfortable armchair and were asked
to relax their muscles but to stay alert. In order to avoid that they
could explicitly realize we wanted to measure the influence of pain
on their social preferences, participants were told that the aim of
the study was to assess their subjective pain threshold while they
were committed in a distracting game (the UG). Figure 1
schematically represents the procedure. Each subject was
preliminarily introduced to the internet-based platform in order
to familiarize with the procedure and to visualize the faces of the
confederates who gave their written informed consent (as outlined
in the PLoS consent form) to publication of their pictures.
After the determination of the laser pain and heat thresholds,
specific instructions prompted subjects to play the responder or the
proposer role (figure 1A). In the responder blocks, subjects were
asked to accept of refuse the offer of other confederates, as follows
(translated from Italian): ‘‘The computer randomly assigned you
the role of responder. You may accept or reject the offers that
come from your opponents. If you accept, the money will be
divided according to the offer, if you reject neither of you will
receive nothing’’. In the proposer blocks subjects were instructed to
decide how to divide the sum of money, as follows (translated from
Italian): ‘‘The computer randomly assigned you to the role of
proposer. You may decide how to allocate the money. If your
opponent accepts the offer, the money will be divided accordingly,
if he/she rejects the offer, no money will be given to any of you’’.
In the responder blocks subjects accepted or rejected the offer by
pressing a button (left to accept, right to reject) with their right
hand. At the end of each interaction, a feedback lasting 4 seconds
informed participants about how much each player received (for
example, ‘‘you get J 30 cents’’ or ‘‘you get J 0’’ if the offer was
accepted or rejected, respectively) (figure 1B).
In the proposer blocks, participants had to decide how to split
money by clicking on one of five possible offers displayed on the
screen (figure 1C). In these blocks no feedback was provided to
avoid any effect of the outcome on the subsequent offer.
Overall, each subject was tested in six experimental blocks. In
the first four blocks, participants were assigned to the responder
role (responder blocks), while in the remaining two blocks they
played as proposers (proposer blocks). For each subject, the responder
block was repeated twice, one for Pain and one for Heat
Condition. This procedure ensured an adequate amount of
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overall amount of 60 iterations in the whole experiment. The
experiment lasted 1 hour. Laser pulses were delivered at the onset
of each trial. The order of Heat and Pain Condition was
counterbalanced across subjects.
Both in the responder and in the proposer blocks, possible offers
ranged from 50 cents to 10 cents, as follows: 50 cents (Fair, F), 40
cents (Moderately Fair, MF), 30 cents (Moderately Unfair, MU),
20 (Unfair, U) and 10 cents (Extremely Unfair, EU). Each
responder block included 10 offers according to the following:
3650 cents, 2640 cents, 3630 cents, 1620 cents and 1610 cents.
Fair offers were restricted to 50 cents assuming that confederates
would not offer more than half of the amount. U and EU offers
were limited since are routinely rejected (4). At the end of the
experiment subjects were debriefed about the purpose of the study.
Subjective ratings of offers’ fairness and laser stimuli
After each trial, participants were asked to assess the fairness of
each offer on a Visual Analogue Scale (VAS) ranging from 0
(unfair) to 100 (fair). The question (translated from Italian) was the
following: ‘‘on a scale of 0 to 100, where 0 corresponds to unfair
and 100 to fair, how would you rate the offer you have just
received?’’. Furthermore, at the end of each block participants
were asked to rate the intensity and the unpleasantness of the laser
stimulation, along a VAS where 0 corresponded to no pain
(intensity or unpleasantness) and 100 the maximum pain that can
be imagined. Finally, subjects were instructed to maintain
attention to the stimuli and to monitor the interaction. This
allowed to check for unwanted fluctuations of attention in the
different blocks. Moreover, participants evaluated the attention
they addressed to the task and to the stimulation, to assess whether
they varied across blocks.
Manipulation check
Immediately after the experiment, participants completed a
four-items questionnaire investigating their feelings about the
experimental task. In particular, they were asked the following
questions (translated from Italian): 1) how much did you use a pre-
defined strategy during the UG (e.g. you decided a-priori to accept
any offer above 30 cents), 2) how much did you feel angry at your
opponents, 3) how much did you feel prone to accept, 4) did you
feel involved in the interaction with your opponents even if you
could not see their faces? For item 1 to 3, evaluations along a 5-
point Likert scale (ranging from 22t o+2) were required. Separate
questions for the Pain and Heat conditions were asked. For item 4
a mere ‘‘yes’’ or ‘‘no’’ response was contemplated. Six subjects
Figure 1. Bilateral Ultimatum Game procedure. Panel A schematically represents the entire procedure. Subjects were introduced to the
internet-based platform which displayed the pictures of the confederates. After the determination of the laser threshold, participants played first as
responders (four blocks of 10 trials each) and then as proposers (two blocks of 10 trials each). Finally, they were presented with a manipulation check.
Panel B: represents the sequence a typical event trial of the responder’s blocks. After a variable interval, subjects received the offer
contemporaneously to a painful or warm laser stimulation. They could accept or reject the offer by means of a button press. Subsequently, a
feedback informed participants how much they received and they could rate the fairness of the offer on a VAS scale ranging from 0 (unfair) to 100
(fair). Panel C represents the sequence of events in a trial of the proposer’s blocks. Participants had to decide how to split money (1J), selecting the
corresponding offer by clicking with the cursor on the image displayed on the screen. No feedback was provided in order to avoid that the
responders’ choice influences the subsequent offer.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0026008.g001
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other players or spontaneously expressed scepticism about the real
existence of the confederates were excluded from the analysis.
Results
Data handling
Data analysis was performed on 24 subjects (12 females; age
range 18–36 M=23.92, SD=4.75). In the responder blocks, we
obtained the acceptance rate (%) for each subject dividing the
frequency of the accepted offers for Fair (or Unfair) by the total of
number of Fair (or Unfair) items. In the proposer blocks, we
computed the offer rate (in %) for each subject. In details, the
frequency of each offer type (10, 20, 30, 40, 50 cents) was
expressed as percentage of the total number of items within each
block. Due to unexpected interruption of the experiment caused
by technical problems, two subjects could not finish the proposer
trials and were excluded from the analysis performed on offer rate.
In the responder blocks, acceptance rates of 40 and 50 offers
and of 30, 20 and 10 offers were collapsed in Fair and Unfair
categories respectively. This procedure allowed us to compare the
same number of trials for each category.
Values of acceptance rate (%) were analyzed by means of a 262
repeated-measures ANOVA with Condition (two levels: Pain and
Heat) and Fairness of Offer (two levels: Fair and Unfair) as main
factors. The same analysis was performed on VAS ratings of
Fairness and reaction times (RTs).
In the proposer blocks a 265 repeated-measures ANOVA was
performed on offer rate (%) values with Condition (two levels: Pain
and Heat) and Fairness of Offer (five levels: 10, 20, 30, 40, 50 cents)
as main factors. A dependent sample t-test was performed to check
for any difference in the RTs of the two conditions. Moreover, we
performed standard multiple regression models on subjective
ratings of intensity and unpleasantness of the painful laser
stimulation (as independent variables) and the acceptance rate of
each offer in the responder block and the frequency of each type of
offer in the proposer block (as dependent variables). Finally, we
performed four separate 262 repeated-measures ANOVAs on i)
Intensity and ii) Unpleasantness of laser stimulation, iii) attention
to stimulation and iv) attention to the task, with Role (two levels,
responder and proposer) and Condition (Pain and Heat) as main
factors. Post-hoc comparisons were performed by means of
Newman-Keuls test.
Acceptance rates in the responder blocks
In the responder blocks, participants modulated their acceptance
rate as a function of Condition as explained by the significance of
the main effect (F1,23=7.20, p=0.013, g
2
p=0.23). Results showed
a higher acceptance rate during Pain with respect to Heat
(Figure 2A). As expected, the acceptance rate was also higher for
Fair with respect to Unfair offers, as revealed by the significance of
the main effect (F1,23=170.40, p,0.000, g
2
p=0.88).
The interaction Condition6Offer was not significant
(F1,23=0.42, p=0.52). Since acceptance of fair offers is usually
at ceiling in the UG, this lack of significance may depend on the
way in which data were collapsed. Thus, we run an additional
ANOVA considering four levels of Fairness of Offer, namely: Fair
(50 cents), Moderately Fair (40 cents), Moderately Unfair (30
cents) and Unfair (10–20 cents) as main factors. The results were
identical to those obtained running a 262 ANOVA. Indeed, we
found significant main effects of Condition (F1,23=5.35, p=.03,
g
2
p=.19), and of Fairness of Offer (F3,69=109.63, p,.0000,
g
2
p=.83) but no significant Condition6Offer interaction
(F3,69=1. 48, p=0.23, NS). Importantly, Newman-Keuls post-hoc
comparisons revealed that participants accepted Fair and
Moderately Fair offers at a similar rate (p=.45, NS) (acceptance
rates raw data % are reported in Table 1).
Fairness scores. ANOVA performed on Fairness scores revealed
higher scores for Fair offers with respect to Unfair offers, as shown
by the main effect of Fairness of Offer (F1,23=129.12, p,0.000,
Figure 2. Pain induces self-regarding preferences. Panel A shows the higher acceptance rate observed in the Pain with respect to Heat
condition in the responder’s blocks. Panel B shows the significant interaction Fairness of Offer6Condition, accounted for by a higher rate of
Moderately Fair offers (40 cents) in Pain with respect to Heat Condition and a lower rate of Fair offers (50 cents) in Pain with respect to Heat Condition
in the proposer’s blocks.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0026008.g002
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2
p=0.85). Importantly, fairness scores were lower in Pain with
respect to Heat condition, as indicated by the main effect of
Condition (F1,23=39.98 p,0.000 g
2
p=0.63). Crucially, we found
a significant interaction Condition6Fairness of Offer (F1,23=6.99
p=0.014 g
2
p=0.23) which was entirely accounted for by lower
VAS scores for Unfair offers during Pain with respect to the Heat
condition (p,0.001, Newman Keuls post-hoc) (Figure 3A).
Reaction Times. ANOVA performed on RTs revealed a main
effect of Fairness of Offer (F1,23=21.80, p,0.001, g
2
p=0.49),
explained by higher RTs to Unfair offers than to Fair offers
(p,0.001). The main effect of Condition and its interaction with
the Fairness of Offer did not reach the significance (all ps.0.05).
Intensity of painful stimulation was predictive of
acceptance rates for moderately unfair offers
The only significant regression model was for 30 cents offers
(R=0.55, Adj R
2=.23, F=4.51, p,.05). In particular, for this type
of offer the intensity of the painful stimulation was predictive of the
acceptance rates (ß=0.61, t21=2.92, p,0.01). For regression
analyses, we computed the Cohen’s f 2: R
2/(12R
2) as an index of
effect size. Cohen’s f 2 was computed on the AdjR
2 (f2=.29). Both
Intensity and Unpleasantness of the warm stimulation were not
predictive of subject’s acceptance rates in the Heat condition.
Offering behaviour in the proposer blocks
We found a significant main effect of the Fairness of Offer
(F4, 84=24.5, p,0.000, g
2
p=0.54) which was entirely accounted
for by higher percentage of MF (40 cents) with respect to F (50
cents) offers (p,0.01) and U offers (all Ps,0.001). Crucially, we
found a significant interaction between Fairness of Offer and
Condition (F4, 84=2.9, p=0.026, g
2
p=0.12). Specifically, we
observed a higher percentages of MF (40 cents) offers in Pain with
respect to Heat Condition (p=0.035) and lower percentages of
Fair offers (50 cents) in Pain, with respect to Heat Condition
(p=0.024) (Figure 2B). The main effect of Condition did not reach
the significance (F1, 21=1.0, p=0.33).
The regression model performed on proposer blocks was not
significant (all Ps..05).
Reaction times were not significantly different between
conditions (t=.33, p=.75, NS).
Intensity and Unpleasantness Ratings. Subjective mea-
sures showed a significant effect of Condition both for Intensity
Table 1. Acceptance rate raw data (%).
Acceptance Rate Pain (%) Acceptance Rate Heat (%)
Subjects Unfair Moderately Unfair Moderately Fair Fair Unfair Moderately Unfair Moderately Fair Fair
1 0 83,33 100 100 0 66,7 100 100
2 0 100 100 100 0 100 100 100
3 0 100 100 100 0 100 100 100
4 25 50 100 100 0 34 100 100
5 0 0 100 100 25 0 75 100
6 0 100 100 100 0 50 100 100
7 0 16,6 100 100 0 33,3 100 100
8 0 50 100 100 25 33,4 100 100
9 0 16,67 75 100 0 0 100 100
10 0 0 100 100 0 0 100 100
11 25 16,67 100 100 25 0 100 100
12 0 66,67 100 100 0 0 75 100
13 25 100 100 100 0 83,34 75 100
14 50 100 100 100 75 100 100 83,34
15 0 100 100 100 0 100 100 100
16 25 83,34 100 100 75 83,34 100 100
17 25 33,34 100 100 0 16,67 75 100
18 0 66,67 75 83,34 25 0 50 100
19 25 0 100 100 0 16,67 100 100
20 25 100 100 100 0 100 100 100
21 0 33,34 100 100 0 50 75 100
22 0 0 100 100 0 0 75 100
23 0 0 100 100 0 16,67 100 83,34
24 0 16,67 75 100 0 33,4 100 83,34
MEAN 9,37 51,39 96,9 99,3 10,41 42,39 91,66 97,91
SD 14,39 40,5 8,44 3,4 22,01 39,3 14,11 5,63
SE 0,16 0,26 0,12 0,07 0,19 0,26 0,15 0,09
The table reports the acceptance rate (%) of Unfair (10–20 cents), Moderately Unfair (30 cents), Moderately Fair (40 cents) and Fair (50 cents) offers presented by each
participant in the Pain (left column) and in the Heat (right column) condition.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0026008.t001
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73.58, p,0.000). Post-hoc test revealed higher VAS scores for
Pain with respect to Heat (all Ps,0.000). We did not find a
significant effect of Role on laser pain Intensity (F1,21=0.08,
p=0.78) or Unpleasantness (F1,21=2.04, p=0.17). Importantly a
significant interaction Role6Condition (F1,21=4.88, p=0.038)
was found only for laser pain Unpleasantness. Post-hoc tests showed
that in the Pain condition, unpleasantness scores were higher when
subjects played as proposers with respect to when they played as
responders (p=0.015) (Figure 3b). No such difference was found in
the Heat Condition (p=0.64, p.0.05).
Attention VAS scores. ANOVA performed on subjective
ratings of attention to stimulation revealed a significant main effect
of Condition (F1,21=63.54, p,0.000) showing higher VAS scores
during Pain with respect to Heat Condition (p,0.000). Neither
Role nor its interaction with Condition were significant (all
Ps.0.05). Subjective ratings of the amount of attention that
participants devoted to the UG task revealed a lack of significance
both for Condition (F1,21=2.23, p=.15) and Role (F1,21=1.91,
p=0.19) as main factors, as well as for their interaction
(F1,21=1.91, p,.18).
Manipulation check
Subjects reported higher ratings of anger when they were in the
Painconditionwith respecttoHeat(t=3.71,p,0.001) and reported
to feel themselves more prone to accept when they were in the Heat
condition with respect to Pain condition (t=22.12, p,0.04).
Interestingly, such subjective impression contrasts with the actual
behaviour of the participants who accepted more offers in the Pain
condition. Scores related to the use of an a-priori strategy (e.g.
accepting any offer below a given value) were not statistically
significant between the two conditions (t=2.97, p=.34, NS).
Discussion
Recent behavioral studies highlighted the crucial role of
incidental negative emotions, as disgust [16], sadness, and anger
[17,18] in exacerbating the human tendency to punish defectors,
an index of prosocial behavior [1]. Here, using a bilateral iterated
version of one-shot UG, we demonstrate that first-hand experience
of pain strongly modulates the strategic economic interaction in
participants playing either the responder or the proposer role. In
particular, we show that feeling pain makes an individual less
inclined to behave according to the social norms (e.g. punishment
of defectors) that regulate most social and economic interactions.
Pain triggers a self-centred perspective when playing the
UG as responder
A plausible interpretation of the fact that people generally
prefer to behave altruistically is that subjects derive higher
hedonic value from the mutual cooperation outcome [21,22,12].
Consistently with this interpretation, it is widely held that the
brain uses a common-reward metric for the processing of both
individual and social rewards [23]. Interestingly, there is evidence
that fairness-directed conducts, such as mutual cooperation with
a human partner [24], donating to a charity [25,26], altruistic
punishment and revenge [27,28] are related to neural activation
of the mesolimbic dopaminergic system. We sought to determine
whether urgent and unpleasant framing, such as that elicited by
an acute painful stimulation, may shift people’s preference
towards the individual reward (i.e. monetary gain). Our results
show that perceiving pain specifically elicits higher acceptance
rates in subjects playing as responders in a bilateral iterated
version of one-shot UG. No such effect was induced by non-
noxious heat stimuli. This result expands previous findings
Figure 3. Fairness and Pain ratings. Panel A shows a significant interaction between Fairness of Offer and Condition, revealing that subjects
expressed more severe judgments for unfair offers in the Pain Condition with respect to the Heat Condition during the responder’s blocks. Panel B
shows the significant interaction between Condition and Role, revealing that subjects judged more unpleasant the painful laser stimulation while
acting as proposers than as responders.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0026008.g003
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interactions by inducing an egocentric bias and reducing the
capacity to react empathically toward others [19]. It is worth
noting that the acceptance rates were higher in the Pain
condition irrespectively of the fairness of the offer, suggesting
that the perception of pain favours the emergence of a
maximizing behavior. Such behavior allows subjects to make
choices aimed at achieving the highest possible gain. Interesting-
ly, this effect is reminiscent of what found in chronic back pain
(CBP) patients playing the Iowa Gambling Task [29], a card
game developed to study emotional decision-making [30].
Notably, CBP patients tended to choose more frequently cards
from the bad decks (those that yielded high immediate gain but
larger future losses) with respect to control subjects. Furthermore,
the performance of these patients turned out to be associated with
the intensity of chronic pain [29]. We showed that the intensity of
the painful stimulation is predictive of the higher acceptance rate
of moderately unfair offers (MU) (i.e. 30 cents) that correspond to
30% of the total pot. Interestingly this is the percentage at which
altruistic punishment starts to occur [4]. Thus, our results raise
the possibility that perceiving pain strongly influences the
economic interaction, inducing suffering individuals to behave
according to selfish motives. It is worth noting that the
enhancement of acceptance rate found in the Pain condition
cannot be attributed to a decreased moral standard in our
participants. On the contrary, participants were more severe,
assigning lower scores to unfair offers in the Pain with respect to
Heat condition. A similar dissociation between appraisal and
actual behavior was found in a low-frequency repetitive
transcranial magnetic stimulation (rTMS) study [13]. rTMS
inhibition of the right dorsolateral prefrontal cortex reduced the
subjects’ ability to resist to the selfish temptation to accept
intentionally unfair offers, but preserved the ability to judge low
offers as unfair [13]. Additional evidence for this segregation
comes from a clinical study [31] which examines the economic
behaviour of patients with focal lesions of ventromedial prefrontal
cortex in comparison to that of patients with damage sparing the
frontal cortex and of healthy subjects. Confirming previous
evidence [32], the results showed that, when playing the standard
version of the UG, patients with lesions to the ventromedial
prefrontal cortex rejected unfair offers at higher rate than non-
frontal patients and healthy subjects. Importantly, the lesion did
not affect the judgment of unfair offers [31].
Pain triggers a self-centred perspective when playing the
UG as proposer
The behavior expressed by subjects acting in the proposer’s role
has been less explored in literature. To the best of our knowledge
there is only one study which explored proposers’ preferences and
conducts. The study shows that sophisticatedly selfish proposers
derived greater pleasure from payoffs patently unbalanced in their
favor rather than from fair payoffs [33]. Consistently, we observed
that when our subjects were playing as proposers their behavior
appeared more strategic and less fair in the Pain than in the Heat
condition. In the Pain but not in the Heat condition, participants
offered more moderately fair (40 cents) than truly fair amounts (50
cents). This result complements and expands a recent study on the
link between pain and money [34] that shows handling money
may reduce pain sensitivity and that thinking of having spent
money exacerbates physical pain.
The unpleasantness of the laser pain was rated as significantly
more unpleasant when subjects played in the proposer than in the
responder role. Although further investigation on this effect is
needed, it hints at the complex interaction between bodily states
and the role during economic interactions.
Participants reported they paid more attention to painful than
warm stimuli. Thus, the higher acceptance rate and the
decreased level of fairness reported by subjects during Pain
conditions of the responder and proposer blocks, could depend
on a lower amount of cognitive resources devoted to the UG task
in Pain than in Heat conditions. However, the subjective ratings
of the amount of attention that subjects devoted to the UG task,
were comparable in Pain and Heat conditions. Moreover, the
analysis performed on Reaction Times both in the Responder’
and in the Proposer’s role did not show a significant main effect
of Condition. Taken together our results suggest that the
cognitive resources allotted to the UG task were comparable in
Pain and Heat conditions.
Pain modulates interactive behavior differently from
other negative emotions
Most of the research attempting to disentangle the role of
negative emotions in the rejection of unfair offers has been
conducted inducing the negative emotion before playing the game
[16,17,18]. Interestingly, subjects who played the UG in the
presence or absence of a disgusting odor showed a higher
acceptance in the latter than the former context [35]. This effect
seems to be gender-selective. Indeed, male participants reported
higher disgust and judged the offer as less unfair than females. One
plausible explanation for this result posits a spontaneous affective
discounting where spontaneous misattribution of the disgust is
typically associated to the unfair offer and to the disgusting
environmental smell [35].
The manipulation check indicates that our subjects were more
angry and less prone to accept in the Pain than in the Heat
condition. It is worth noting that in our study painful stimulation
and the offers perception were contemporary. In principle,
participants might have misattributed the anger they felt for the
unfair offer to the painful stimulation that they were receiving.
This explanation seems unlikely for at least two reasons. First, the
misattribution hypothesis [36,35] is based on the appraisal theory
that suggests specific cognitions are important antecedents of
specific emotions and thereby of specific action tendencies
[37,38]. Were this the case, our participants should have
presented higher fairness ratings for unfair offers in the Pain
condition. As a matter of fact, subjects reported lower fairness
ratings for the unfair offers in the Pain condition which is exactly
the opposite pattern of results. On the contrary, they accepted
more in the Pain condition irrespectively of the fairness of the
offer.
In conclusion, some negative emotions like induced disgust,
modulate social preferences differently from pain. This may be
surprising because the above negative emotions are underpinned
by neural regions, e.g. the insular cortex, that also represent pain
[39,40]. Thus, an additional point of interest of our paradigm is
that it may be useful for investigating the neural correlates of
induced social preferences.
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